– By Medha Shukla

Intern IPPCS’21

The Asian continent is a locale within which reside emerging powers surviving within the context of anarchy, competition, and interdependence. This region has a composition of countries which are vital players of international politics with their own strategic strengths and interests. While there are three major powers in the region- India, Japan, and China- ASEAN countries along with Russia, which is regaining a foothold, are becoming eminent powers within regional organizations. Amongst the regional superpowers India shares close and cordial relations with Japan. Certain records claim this partnership to have existed since, prior to India’s independence, in one form or another. With China’s desire to become a global, leading power many have seen the bilateral ties between Japan and India as a balancing act to keep regional power relations in check. While China’s rise is a common concern that both countries battle with, the relationship is significant to both owing to deeper connections. 

The first exchange between the two nations was cultural in nature, namely, the introduction of Buddhism in Japanese society. This exchange of the 6th century flourished into a stronger bond via the connection’s eminent Indian personalities like Judge Radha Binod Pal, Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose etc. established with the country and their counterparts. Additionally, India’s absence, as a newly independent nation, at the San Francisco Conference was deeply symbolic. Alternatively, India had separately signed a peace treaty with Japan which defined the bilateral relations between the two. 

Formally established on 28th April 1952 the diplomatic relations between the two nations have since then been cordial and consistent. It was in 1991 that the ties between the two were tested resulting in Japan standing by India during its crisis of balance payment. A decade later a ‘Global Partnership’ was established following PM Yoshiro Mori’s visit. As the Indian economy grew many economic opportunities were created which lured the Japanese corporate sector, thus became a key string that strengthened the bilateral relations in contemporary times. Fourteen years later, September 2014, the bilateral bond was upgraded to a ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’, summits under which continue to be held. Leaders of both countries have been vocal on their common goal of ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific. This forms part of the Japan-India Vision Statement which is a guide for the new era relations between the two. The relationship between the two nations is multi-faceted in nature and is driven by forces of functional needs (i.e., complementary economies), interdependence, and mutual gain. Many analysts agree that despite having so much in common bilateral ties remain under materialized. While India is one of the top beneficiaries of Japanese investments within the region, full potential within the Official Development Assistance (ODA) domain is still to be achieved. Key engagement areas for the future include biotechnology, environmental energy, nuclear energy, and other non-traditional domains such as climate change. 

The bilateral ties of India and Japan make for an interesting paradox in the realm of international relations. Two countries that do not have major disruptions, e.g., wars, sanctions, political fallouts, prior to and since establishment of relations the potential of their partnership remains to be discovered to date. Since his appointment PM Modi has closely worked alongside his Japanese counterpart in furthering the bilateral relations established by his predecessor. It only helped that the two leaders, Modi and Abe, developed strong personal relations over shared visions. Japan is currently a technological powerhouse, also capable of providing funding, which can immensely help India in developmental and infrastructural aspects. Alongside economic progress ministerial dialogues between defence personnel and national security advisors have also been held frequently. A landmark event in this domain is the proposed deal for the procurement of Japan’s US-2 amphibian aircrafts. 

Apart from bilateral ties the two nations are also part of a trilateral dialogue along the United States. These three countries further share another stage i.e., the QUAD, a relatively new grouping with four member nations as of now. Marmite cooperation between the allies has taken place in the shape of the annual India-US Malabar exercise, which is now being extended to all three defence wings. As mentioned above, the deep camaraderie shared between Abe and Modi has been a driving force between the growing ties in the past few years, therefore the change in Japanese leadership brought with it certain uncertainties. While on the onset PM Yoshihide Suga seems to have a similar outlook towards ties with India as his predecessor, strings from his past suggest that he might practice a non-confrontational approach towards China. In his first visit to the United States, he has spoken positively towards Japan’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, this preview sets an optimistic stage for his future visit to India. 

While the balancing strategy against China’s ‘unilateral’ actions is expected to continue owing to Abe’s influence over the top ministry and Suga, who resonates with Abe’s ideology to a greater extent. The key positions in the cabinet are held by personnel who are sure to ensure continuity of cooperation with India and fellow QUAD members. It is LDP’s Secretary General, Toshihiro Nikai’s views and influences from Suga’s hometown Yokohama that pose a slight worry to leaders in New Delhi and Washington. These two factors are expected to be the voices favoring China, but against this stands the public opinion against China that has grown recently owing to the Galwan valley clashes. A key aspect for India will be to ensure continuation of the third country projects undertaken along with Japan. Also, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations outreach policy is integral to creating an integrated region that stands united against China’s expansionist policies. Unlike Abe, Suga is not an active participant in the domain of foreign policy and therefore might place it as a complementary aspect to domestic politics. Therefore, it will become imperative for India to identify its lobby in Japan and interact with key domestic policy drivers. 

Suga recently shared his thoughts on relations with India in a video message at the inaugural ceremony of Varanasi Cooperation and Convention Centre (VICCC). In his long message Suga emphasized on the symbolism of the VICCC and his views on future areas of cooperation “… Japan and India will work to overcome this challenge [COVID-19] and make utmost efforts to further develop bilateral ties under special strategic and global partnerships through cooperation in areas such areas as green society, digital, cyber, healthcare and enhancing connectivity.”. So far there are no red flags that might hinder this progressing relation, the upcoming QUAD summit will further provide clarity on the changes, if any, that the new leadership will bring along. Careful observation along with identifying the various opportunities of collaboration with Japan are key to establishing this new version of India-Japan relations. 

References

Bagchi, Indrani. ‘Suga in Japan saddle, India will need to tweak template’. 19th September 2020. 10 September 2021. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-eyes-more-ambitious-approach-to-japanese-business-as-new-pm-takes-over/articleshow/78194474.cms>.

Correspondent, HT. ‘India, Japan share same fundamental values’: PM Yoshihide Suga. 15 July 2021. 10 September 2021. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-japan-share-same-fundamental-values-pm-yoshihide-suga-101626350228388.html>.

India, MInistry of External Affairs. “A Brief on India Japan relations.” February 2020. 11 September 2021. <https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Japan_Bilateral_Brief_feb_2020.pdf>.

“‘India-Japan: Time to sieze new opportunities’.” 2020. FICCI . 11 September 2021. <https://www.jcci.or.jp/Report_India-Japan%20Time%20to%20Seize%20New%20Opportunities.pdf>.

Kesavan, K. V. India and major powers: Japan . 09 August 2019. 11 September 2021. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-and-major-powers-japan-54248/>.

Mathur, Arpita. “India-Japan Relations.” n.d. RSIS Mobograph Vol 23. 10 September 2021. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2000/01/Monograph23.pdf>.

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