– By Merlin Pattath

The formation of QUAD is the perfect example of the theory of balance of power. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is a group of four countries: the United States, Australia, India, and Japan that promotes maritime cooperation among them to keep China at bay. 

Quad first came into existence after the 2004 tsunami and saw some formalization in 2007. At that time Australia had issues, with the grouping again meeting a decade later in 2017 at the official level. At the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, Japan Self-Defense Forces Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, warned of China’s “powerful and expanding” military power and called upon India, the United States, Australia, and Japan to cooperate with one another to “deter Chinese provocations.” The naval chiefs of the four nations constituting the Quad—the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—convened at Raisina to discuss the search for order in the Indo-Pacific region. The first official meeting of this quadrilateral grouping took place in Manila in November 2017 on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia Summits. Given China’s recent assertiveness on regional security issues, the Quad has the potential to become an effective balancing mechanism to counter China in Asia. 

The future of  “Quad” has tremendous significance, not just in the Indo-Pacific, but everywhere. Decision-makers, risk managers, investors, CEOs, and regular citizens increasingly are aware of rising stakes in a new, global balance of power.

Implications in 2021

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit held on March 12, 2021, did not name China directly, but Beijing seemed anxious and rattled about the event, as its mouthpiece Global Times speculated US, Japan, India, and Australia to be hyping the “China threat” even before the event. Chinese response of calling Quad meeting as ‘selective multilateralism’ and ‘covid politics’ shows its frustration due to the emergence of an alternate global vaccination collaboration, something which China had unilaterally reserved for itself for profiteering. Quad’s assertion to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation, overflight, democratic values, and territorial integrity has added to the frustration of Beijing, which has started firing a salvo of propaganda through its mouthpiece Global Times, calling India (the only Non-NATO partner) as “Negative Asset for BRICS and SCO(Shanghai Cooperation Organisation)” failing to understand Chinese goodwill. With the series of foundational agreements like COMCASA(Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement), BECA(Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation) signed between US and India, and naval exercises, the operability of India with other Quad members, operating within NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) military alliance framework, has improved.

India is the only country amongst Quad members which has an unsettled land border with China. China has done its best to create some apprehension in the  minds of the other Quad members, by keeping China -India relations fluctuating between tension and harmony with incidents like Doklam, Wuhan, and Ladakh. After the Doklam and Ladakh standoffs, it’s quite clear to Indians that China can’t be trusted, which has brought relatively better clarity in the Indian position. The economic entanglement of each of the Quad members with China necessitates a resilient supply chain, digital and technological ecosystem, with minimal dependence on China.

There has been consensus regarding support for ASEAN’s centrality as well as the outlook on the Indo-Pacific, but their inclusion into it will be a debatable issue, due to Chinese influence over them. Generally, some of the affected ASEAN countries have occasionally raised a feeble voice against Chinese aggression (Philippines, Vietnam), expecting world powers to check Chinese adventurism, as they find it difficult to stand up against the Chinese might by themselves. This has emboldened China to continue incremental encroachment in SCS(South China Sea) and the region. China has always tried to deal with every country on bilateral terms, using its Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to its advantage. In forthcoming bilateral engagements with US, Japan and India, it will continue to aim for weakening the Quad, by some bilateral concessions.

One of the biggest outcomes of the 2021 summit was, COVID-19 vaccines will be manufactured in India, financed by the US and Japan with logistical support from Australia. The intention of Quad to synergise medical, scientific, financing, manufacturing, critical emerging-technology and developmental capabilities in future, is a step in right direction. Sharing of innovative technology and capacity building for climatic challenges will serve the interest of humanity. These statements have hyped good optics, but if sincerely implemented will certainly make Quad an effective grouping.

Quad members must continue freedom of navigation exercises and military posturing in the Indo-Pacific, as China continues to do so. If the strategic situation worsens there may be a need to position ‘UN Maritime Military Observers Group’, as prevention of accidental triggering of conflict is possible in a region having a high density of combat ships on FON(Freedom of navigation) missions.

The Summit did not signal expansion, but it needs to have the flexibility to incorporate like-minded democratic countries, as many would be keen to join Quad in future because the Indo-Pacific region is becoming the economic center of gravity and manufacturing hub of the world. Support of other navies like France, the UK, Germany, and other NATO members will be good deterrence to peace spoilers. Quad in its present form may not be structured to check Chinese adventurism, but it certainly has the potential to become one of the most effective instruments to do so. Chinese reactions indicate that it certainly has put China on notice, without even naming it.

2021 was the year for bite-sized multilateralism. In the midst of a torrid second wave, particularly in India, the Indian foreign policy had to adjust to a “new, new normal” in global geopolitics. 

2022 Projections

Members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)–India, the US, Australia, and Japan– have largely agreed on the annual summit schedule which will happen rotationally between the four countries. Quad could be institutionalised which could turn it to a more powerful body.

India is willy-nilly drawn into the US-China great power competition, which has necessitated so many of India’s diplomatic moves in the past year and will continue to do so in 2022. The fact that China effectively tore up border agreements of 30 years means Beijing is playing a bigger game against India that could, if India is not vigilant and proactive enough, continue to tie it down at its borders, both on the Chinese and Pakistani fronts. This realization is enforced with foreign minister S Jaishankar and Defence minister Rajnath Singh’s frequent flagging of the continued Chinese threat. Both in 2020 and 2021, China engaged in the kind of usurious price gouging and supply destabilization that led India, Australia, and Japan to start a smaller grouping to build resilient supply chains. This initiative is likely to be absorbed into the larger Quad, but the idea remains the same — trusted, small networks, shorter supply chains and investment and trade linked to these chains. Most of them keep China out or in areas where it can be easily replaced. 

India has been looking west with greater interest in the past few years. It has built close ties with the Arab Gulf and Israel while retaining its civilizational ties with Iran. Therefore, it seemed natural to build the second Quad in West Asia — Israel, India, UAE and the US came together to build digital and physical infrastructure, maritime security and technology. As a matter of fact, the only meaningful grouping that crumbled was a promising India-France-Australia trilateral that fell into the form of AUKUS, although it does help to beat China by pooling resources, integrating defence and industrial supply chains. However, 2022 may see India and France cooperating with the UAE as the definition of Indo-Pacific broadens to beyond the western Indian Ocean. The broad idea seems to be this: By putting a political/ strategic value to technology and infrastructure, these plurilateral arrangements are building alternatives to authoritarian China. Quad nations also plan to create infrastructure alternatives to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Australian government has concluded the historic Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan, which enables mutual military co-operation, and secured the elevation of the India relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, with the possibility of an FTA by the end of 2022. 

References :

https://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/l326-Balance-of-Power-in-International-Relations.html

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF137/CF137.chap5.pdf

https://chanakyaforum.com/evolution-of-balance-of-power-in-international-relations/

https://southasianvoices.org/soft-balancing-asia/

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/jaishankar-plans-australia-visit-next-week-for-quad-and-bilateral-meets/articleshow/89336071.cms

https://www.wionews.com/india-news/quad-summits-on-the-anvil-japan-in-2022-india-in-2023-australia-in-2024-429119

https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/quad-summit-2021-why-is-china-rattled/2212544/

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/

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