– By Amisha Das

“Andaman and Nicobar Islands are very strategically located. They overlook the entire sea lines of communication and choke lines (in the Indian Ocean Region).” – Navy Chief Admiral R. K. Dhowan.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), which remained quiet for some time after the Cold War has re-emerged as a critical theatre for strategic competition, with China expanding its presence in the IOR, India has formulated a new maritime approach to retain its prominence in the region with the Andaman and Nicobar Islands at the center of its plan.

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI) are two groups of islands expanding over an area of 8,294 sq km. The entire island chain of 836 islands, often referred to as one of the most strategically located island chains in the world, is critical to India’s strategic interests in the IOR and Indo-Pacific. They comprise the sole archipelago in the Bay of Bengal, overlooking important sea lines of communication and choke lines. The significance of the ANI has been well known even during the 11th century Chola dynasty when the king was said to have a strategic naval base to send the expeditions into Indonesia. 

The ANI is not only geographically far away from India but for most of the 20th century, has also been far away from the consciousness of Indians, owing to the long-standing ‘protectionist’ approach, to preserve the islands in its “existential setting against the pulls of exploitative enticements.” Recently the rising national interest to strengthen ties with Southeast Asia has led to a change in strategy in the governance of the islands- to ensure “all-round national development”, and largely owed to the greater Chinese presence in the IOR, threatening the freedom of navigation. In the quest for new energy resources in the region, China has acquired a foothold in critical junctures of Chittagong, Hambantota, Gwadar, and Kyankpyu popularly known as the “String of Pearls.” 

Strategic Importance vis-à-vis geography of Andaman and Nicobar Islands

To make the ANI more relevant to India’s security and development goals, the answer lies in its geography. The islands are located closer to Southeast Asian countries than to the Indian mainland— the Landfall islands, the northernmost tip of the island groups is only 20 km away from Coco islands, Myanmar;  Port Blair, the capital of the union territory is 668 km away from Ranong coast, Thailand and the southernmost tip of the ANI, the Indira Point is 80 km from Sumatra in Indonesia. Other than the geographical proximity, ANI’s physical layout provides for a vital role in ensuring maritime security in the region.

The ANI overlooks the Preparis Channel, the Ten and Six Degree Channels, Duncan’s Passage, and the Malacca Strait- the juncture of Indian and Pacific Oceans.  A major sea line of communication, nearly 40% of the world trade (about 250 ships per day) transit through the Six Degree Channel, owing to the ANI’s location, India has a great advantage in monitoring these transits via the Indian Ocean along with projecting military strength into Southeast Asia and beyond. Similarly, the Ten-Degree Channel, through which the majority of trade passes from the South China Sea and the Pacific, into the Indian Ocean, is right between the north and south Nicobar islands. By virtue of the ANI, India controls 2.1 million sq km of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which is nearly 30% of India’s total EEZ.

Over the years ANI has been a ‘staging post’ for humanitarian efforts, traditionally by India in the Bay of Bengal. Especially by the Indian Navy, building on its 2004 tsunami relief experience, the Navy has undertaken a wide range of Human Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations in the regional seas, ranging from major evacuation efforts in Yemen to alleviating the drinking water crisis in the Maldives and providing relief supplies to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Indonesia during these natural disasters.

Countering the China factor

Known as the ‘manufacturing hub’ of the world, the majority of China’s exports are transported via the Malacca Strait. And almost 80% of China’s energy requirements, i.e oil and gas are transferred through the Channel and Malacca Strait. To overcome what is called China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’, the Chinese have set out to expand their footprint in the IOR and fulfill their maritime Silk Road ambitions that have “fueled apprehensions about freedom of navigation in these waters.” January 2020, six Chinese research vessels were spotted in the IOR, and a survey ship, Xiang Yang Hong 03, was accused of running dark or operating without transmitting its position in the Indonesian waters, heading towards the Indian Ocean in January 2021. 

Considering this growing Chinese presence, two consequences can be expected in the IOR— firstly, by gaining ground of these crucial chokepoints, China could use them to their advantage during a standoff with India or any other adversary, since all major countries like Japan, Australia, etc rely on these passages for their oil and gas imports; and secondly, a counterbalance by the Indian Navy can be expected, including an increased deployment of anti-submarine warfare aircraft in the ANI. 

To counter China, India is working with partner countries on developmental and military projects. A crucial collaboration, the United States and Japan- ‘Sound Surveillance System’ (SOSUS)- a chain of sensors designed to track submarines has been set up creating a counter wall of sorts against the Chinese submarines loitering in the Andaman Sea and the deep South China Sea, this intelligence will be shared by Japan with the United Kingdom, Australia, and India. In 2018, India and Indonesia reached an agreement to establish a special task force to develop connectivity between the post of Sabang and ANI, under their “Shared Vision of India-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.”

In addition, the development of a transshipment port at Great Nicobar, which is located close to the Malacca Strait and the East-West shipping route connecting Europe and Africa with Asia, is underway. Other developmental projects include the optic fiber connectivity between Chennai and Port Blair facilitating telecom connectivity, two bridges on the Andaman Trunk Road, an extension of Diglipur airport runway, and the ‘Pawan Hans’ helicopter service for better inter-island connectivity, to name a few. 

Often referred to as the ‘unsinkable aircraft carriers’, India’s first tri-service command- Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) was established in 2001. India’s military presence in the IOR got a boost with the commission of a full-fledged naval base, INS Kohassa in North Andaman Island. A ten-year “roll-on” plan at an estimated cost of five thousand crore rupees is being worked out for creating new, improving and strengthening existing military infrastructure for additional troops, warships, aircraft, and drones in the ANC. Leveraging the locational proximity to Southeast Asia, the ANC conducts joint maritime exercises such as the Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise and Coordinated Patrols with Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia. It also conducts MILAN, a biennial multilateral naval exercise, to build friendship across the seas. Twenty countries participated in the 2018 edition, making it the largest naval exercise in the Andaman Sea.

Conclusion

The IOR is termed as a global highway through which the majority of the oil and cargo passes to and fro the Indian Ocean and Pacific. It is also seen as a theatre of strategic contestation; if one looks at the geopolitical games that are being played in the Indo-Pacific region, most of them are played in the IOR. Unlike the South China Sea which can be said to be a contested theatre with live disputes leading to a virtual gridlock reducing the capacity of power projection; the IOR is an open ocean with room for power projection by China, the US, Australia, Japan, France, and India- who considers the IOR to be a veritable backyard. Hence for India, protecting its takes in the IOR where it faces several traditional and non-traditional threats is critical. This is where the ANI becomes important- as a strategic outpost to defend vital stakes in the IOR and beyond. 

The building of defense infrastructure and commissioning new naval bases, along with collaborations with like-minded democracies are steps in the right direction as these underscore India’s stakes in this emerging and important theatre. Though these developments should go hand in hand with cooperation and confidence by countries in the IOR, since in the mid-1990s when India began developing a military presence in the ANI, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which were interested in terms of development and harnessing the strategic capabilities of the ANI initially did not see the projections of ANI as positive developments.

From the logic of ‘minimalist security’ presence sought by many nations in terms of preserving peace and prosperity in the IOR to active military developments, it will be essential to note how the geopolitical and maritime security dynamics evolve with the months and years to come, with contestations for control and recognition of ANI to counter the Chinese aggression by India and stakeholder nations, as well as to springboard trade and commerce, as per India’s ‘Act East Policy.’

References :

  1. https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ORF_IssueBrief_495_AndamanNicobar-1.pdf
  2. https://www.cescube.com/vp-increasing-strategic-importance-of-andaman-and-nicobar-islands
  3. https://eurasiantimes.com/lessons-from-ladakh-india-to-enhance-defence-capabilities-in-andaman-nicobar-islands-to-keep-china-away/
  4. https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/the-andaman-and-nicobar-islands-new-delhis-bulwark-in-the-indian-ocean/

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